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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
CONFRONTING THE TRUE MEANING OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE
In Walz v. Tax Commission1 the Supreme Court for the
first time considered the constitutionality of a state law which
exempted real property used exclusively for religious purpos-
es from ad valorem taxation. Walz, a New York City prop-
erty owner, attacked the validity, under the first and four-
teenth amendments, of certain provisions of New York's Con-
stitution 2 and real property tax laws.3 He asserted that, by
virtue of these property tax exemptions for religious institu-
tions, he was being forced to support the establishment of re-
ligion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
judgment4 against Walz. In an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
1 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
2 N. Y. CONST., art. XVI, §1 provides in part:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by gen-
eral laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except
those exempting real or personal property used exclu-
sively for religious, educational or charitable purposes
as defined by law and owned by any corporation or
association organized or conducted exclusively for one
or more such purposes and not operating for profit.
3 N. Y. RlAL Pnop. TAX LAWS, § 420 (1) (McKinney Supp.
1960) provides in part:
Real property owned by a corporation or association
organized exclusively for the moral or mental improve-
ment of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract,
charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary,
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar
association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical
or cemetery purposes . . . and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes
. . . shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this
section.
- Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298
N.Y.S. 2d 711 (1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
[Vol. 7, No. I
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Burger, expressing the view of five members, the New York
exemption was upheld because: (1) the exemption was not
limited to religious activities, but was granted to a broad
class of non-profit organizations; and (2) the exemption grant-
ed to religious organizations created only a minimal church-
state involvement which was more desirable than the involve-
ment which would result if religious organizations were taxed.
The limited and well-defined factual basis for the attack
by Walz presented the most potent challenge yet made against
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Each of
the Court's first amendment religion cases, subsequent to the
incorporation of the first amendment religion clauses into the
fourteenth amendment, 5 had contained broad factual situa-
tions which allowed the Court a degree of latitude in formu-
lating its decisions. 6 There had always been a basis for the
argument that religion was an incidental beneficiary while
the public at large was the primary beneficiary. However,
the tax provisions challenged by Walz exempted property
used exclusively for religious purposes; thus, religion was the
sole beneficiary.
The absence of any prior decisions specifically ruling on
5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
0 These cases primarily involved the various aspects of direct
and indirect public support for parochial schools and re-
ligious instruction in public schools. Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (use of tax funds to pay costs of
transportation to parochial schools); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction in public
schools); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (permissive
"released time" religious instruction in public schools);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (voluntary in-school
prayer); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (man-
datory in-school religious exercises); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (use of public funds to furnish
books for students attending parochial schools).
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the constitutionality of religious tax exemptions7 forced the
Court to rely on earlier cases which had interpreted the gen-
eral meaning of the first amendment religion clauses.8 In ad-
judicating the controversies which had arisen under the first
amendment religion clauses, the Court traditionally had ad-
hered to a course of constitutional neutrality. In so doing, the
Court had maintained a delicate balance between inhibiting
the free exercise of religion and preventing its establishment.
The Court had refrained from applying a literal meaning to
the religion clauses by viewing their purpose as merely stat-
ing an objective to be achieved, not as a mandate which must
be followed strictly. This approach had resulted in what ap-
peared to be internal inconsistencies in the Court's decisions.
These decisions had been further complicated by the absence
of a universal criteria by which the cases could be reconciled.
These problems were recognized by the Court in Walz.
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area
cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could
7 Two cases previously had been dismissed by the Court for
failure to present a substantial federal question. Lundberg
v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921
(1956) (tax on real property); General Fin. Corp. v. Ar-
chetto, 93 R.I. 372, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369
U.S. 423 (1962) (tax on tangible and intangible property).
Certorari was denied in a third case. Murray v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 816 (1966).
S In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), Mr. Jus.
tice Black, speaking for the five-four majority, stated:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another. (emphasis added)
Yet, within the same opinion, the Court upheld the use of
tax-raised public funds to pay the costs of transporting
children to parochial schools.
[Vol. 7, No. I
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well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions,
which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. The
general principle deducible from the First Amend-
ment and all that has been said by the Court is this:
that we will not tolerate either governmentally es-
tablished religion or governmental interference with
religion
By refusing to adopt a literal interpretation of the first
amendment religion clauses which would have precluded any
interrelationship between church and state, the Court had
acknowledged that the coexistence of the two clauses neces-
sarily required some nexus. However, the demarcation line
between permissible and impermissible governmental actions
could be determined only on a case-by-case basis. According-
ly, any general principles which the Court had formulated in
this area were developed in a series of cases. Any attempted
extraction of isolated language within a single opinion could
lead to an apparent inconsistency in the findings of the Court
in a subsequent case.10
In deciding the Walz case, the Court utilized the primary
effect test which it had formulated in earlier religion cases.1
This test considers two aspects of each legislative enactment:
(1) the purpose of the enactment; and (2) the primary effect
of the enactment. If either the purpose or the primary effect
9 397 U.S. at 669.
10 The danger of possible constitutional contradiction was
recognized by the Court in the Walz opinion. Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, stated:
The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of
the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been
too sweeping utterances on aspects of these [religion]
clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases
but have limited meaning as general principles.
397 U.S. at 668.
1 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
19711
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"is the advancement or inhibition of religion", the enactment is
proscribed by the establishment clause. 12
Including property used exclusively for religious purposes
within a broad class of tax-exempt property owned by non-
profit and quasi-public corporations indicated a legislative in-
tent to exempt selectively from taxation those institutions
which are regarded as beneficial to the community. This ex-
emption was viewed as a historical right designed to foster the
moral or mental improvement of the community. This right
existed independent of the "good works" theory for exempting
church property from taxation which had been developed by
numerous state courts.18 Adoption of the "good works" ra-
tionale, the Court reasoned, would foster a subjective basis for
the exemption of church property. Because the scope of the ac-
tivities of the various churches varies greatly, a subjective
standard necessarily would result in "producing the kind of
day-to-day-relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to
minimize."14
The Court's examination of the effect of the exemption
required a determination of whether the legislation operated
as a direct subsidy. Numerous authors who have advanced
various theories on this subject have reached dissimilar con-
12 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), quoting
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
1 In affirming the judgment against Walz, the New York
Court of Appeals, citing numerous cases, noted that "courts
throughout the country have long and consistently held
that the exemption of such real property from taxation does
not violate the Constitution of the United States." 24 N.Y.2d
30, 31, 246 N.E.2d 517, 518, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (1969);
See also Fellman, Separation of Church and State in the
United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 427, 454;
Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the
United States, 18 Mnwx. L. REv. 411, 416 (1934).
14 397 U.S. at 674.
[Vol. 7, No. I
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clusions.15 Since an unrestricted allocation of tax-raised funds
to religious organizations clearly would be unconstitutional, 16
a tax exemption for church property would be equally un-
constitutional if there were not a significant distinction be-
tween an appropriation and an exemption. The Justices were
divided on whether such a distinction existed. The majority
concluded that an exemption was not a subsidy, reasoning
that a subsidy requires the transfer of public funds while an
exemption is only an abstention from collection at the source.
Thus, according to the majority, churches were being per-
mitted merely to retain undiminished the contributions which
they had received from their memberships. On the other hand,
Mr. Justice Douglas, who strongly dissented, argued that the
exemption is in actuality a subsidy because the economic
result is identical. Answering this argument, the majority con-
sidered the economic effect of an exemption to be indirect
and therefore not violative of the first amendment.
The Court conceded that both taxation and exemption
would give rise to a degree of church-state involvement. Up-
holding the constitutionality of the tax exemption was con-
sidered desirable in order to prevent the direct involvement
which would naturally follow through "tax valuation of church
property, tax liens, tax foreclosures and the direct confronta-
'r See generally Bitker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution,
78 YALE L. J. 1285 (1969); Cohen, Constitutionality of Tax
Exemptions Accorded American Church P r o p e r t y, 30
ALBANY L. REv. 58 (1966); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-
Establishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARv. L. REv.
513, 551 (1968); Korbel, Do the Federal Income Tax Laws
Involve an "Establishment of Religion"?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1018
(1967); Wolder, Income and Real Estate Tax-Exemption
Problems of Churches and Associations, 45 TAXES 613 (1967);
Note, The Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religious-
ly Used Property, 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 533 (1970).
16 In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) and En-
gel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court declared uncon-
stitutional a direct tax subsidy for religious purposes.
1971]
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tions and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes."'1 7 This conclusion was reached by considering two
factors: (1) whether the involvement would be excessive;
and (2) whether the nature and duration of the involvement
would ultimately lead to an "impermissible degree of entangle-
ment.",8
The Court realized that the granting of tax exemptions
to religious organizations resulted in indirect economic bene-
fits, but concluded that:
The hazards of churches supporting government are
hardly less in their potential than the hazards of gov-
ernment supporting churches; each relationship car-
ries some involvement rather than the desired insu-
lation and separation.19
By upholding the exemption, the Court reasoned that it
could avoid the entanglements which may result if the exemp-
tion were denied. In summary the Court stated:
The exemption creates only a minimal and remote in-
volvement between church and state and far less than
taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship
between church and state, and tends to complement
and reinforce the desired separation insulating each
from the other.0
Perhaps the most important result of the Walz decision
is the Court's recognition that the wall beween church and
state is a legal fiction. The height, breadth and composition
17 397 U.S. at 674. Furthermore, as noted by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan in his concurring opinion, the denial of the exemption
could conflict with the mandate of the free exercise clause.
397 U.S. at 680. Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969); Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of
God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
18 397 U.S. at 675.
'9 Id.
20 Id. at 676.
[Vol. 7, No. I
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of the wall has been the central topic of a lively debate which
has raged for more than two decades. Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation21 established a wall of gigantic proportions. Subsequent
decisions diminished the strength of the wall by granting ex-
ceptions to the basic doctrine which required absolute sep-
aration between church and state. One writer has noted:
The wall has done what walls usually do: it has
obscured the view. It has lent a simplistic air to the
discussion of a very complicated matter. Hence it has
caused confusion whenever it has been invoked. Far
from helping to decide cases, it has made opinions and
decisions unintelligible. The wall is offered as a reason.
It is not a reason; it is a figure of speech.P
If, in fact, the wall has become a "permeable membrane, 23
what guidelines are left to lend predictability to what the
Court will do in the future? How can a state avoid an imper-
missible involvement between church and state when granting
tax exemptions to religious organizations? In light of the Walz
decision, one obvious answer is a broadly-worded exemption
statute. Another method would be a proper application of the
test set out in School District v. Schempp.24
The broadly worded statute in Walz allowed the Court
to adroitly sidestep the basic establishment issue. Religion was
only one of many activities covered by the statute. By con-
sidering the statute as a whole, the Court was not forced to
rule on the constitutionality of a statute exempting from tax-
ation only church property. As long as the Court is able to
discern a valid secular purpose for a legislative enactment, it
probably will not examine its separate parts. To do otherwise
would force a direct confrontation between church and state
which the Court apparently seeks to avoid. The Court fully
21 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
-2 Hutchins, Th.e Future of the Wall, in TH WALL BETw_
CHURCH AN STATE 17, 19 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
3 Id. at 20.
24 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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appreciates the fact that church and state must cooperate in
many joint endeavors in which each aids the other, including
church-state weddings, tax exemptions, chaplains in the mili-
tary services.25 When the words of a particular statute are not
pointed clearly in one direction it has been asserted that the
the statutory language may have "a far greater influence
upon the decision than theoretical doctrines of interpreta-
tion."26 As noted by the Court, "it is an essential part of ad-
judication to draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the
process of interpreting the Constitution."2 7
The Schempp test for church-state neutrality possesses the
same irresistible element of simplicity which prolonged the
existence of the wall doctrine. The Schempp test, as it is pres-
ently advanced, can serve safely only as a general guideline
and not as an absolute standard for determining the proper
bounds of church-state relationships. According to the Schempp
test, a law must have a central secular purpose which clearly
outweighs any incidental religious purpose. It is a misnomer
to label a religious purpose as incidental, because, although the
religious purpose may be incidental to the state, it may have
overwhelming religious significance for the church. When this
condition is present, both church and state purposes co-exist,
but the state's secular purpose must be clearly and overwhelm-
ingly dominant. Also, the method by which the secular purpose
is achieved must be secular in nature. It was the use of a re-
ligious method, religious exercises, to accomplish a secular
25 For a more extensive list of governmental accommodations
to religion, see Paulsen, Constitutional Problems of Utilizing
A Religious Factor In Adoptions and Placement of Child-
ren, in THE WALL BETwEEN CmmcH AND STATE 117 (D. Oaks
ed. 1963); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299-304
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Kurland, The School
Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
142 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
26 Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 Omo
ST. L.J. 461, 504 (1959).
27 397 U.S. at 679.
[Vol. 7, No. 1
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goal, moral development, which led to the Court's adverse
ruling in at least one school prayer case.28 If the secular pur-
pose of a statute is subservient to its religious purpose because
of the method selected to implement it, the statute will be
unconstitutional.
The difficulty in applying the Schempp test lies in de-
termining the effect of the statute. This test does not contain
criteria by which it can be determined objectively whether a
statute advances or inhibits religion. It is obvious from even
a casual examination of the Court's earlier decisions that what
the Court says and does in any one case may conflict.29 Appar-
ently, the only requirement is that the church not receive a
greater share of the benefits than the state. If a statute pro-
portionately increases the influence of both church and state,
so that their respective influence remains constant, the Court
probably will hold that the religious effect is neutral. It is ir-
relevant that, when the religious effect is viewed separately, it
clearly appears that religion has benefited. As long as religion
does not benefit more than the state, religion has not been
advanced, and the statute will be constitutional.
Perhaps the two walls theory, advanced by one writer,30
should be adopted by the Court. At the very least, this device
would serve as an illustrative aid to reconcile the Court's de-
cisions which appear to be in hopeless conflict. Under this
theory there are two parallel walls; one belongs exclusively
to the state while the other belongs exclusively to the church.
Between the walls is an area in which church and state
co-exist. Within this no man's land exist all matters of joint
church-state concern. The state has exclusive control over this
area and independently determines which matters are proper
for joint concern. The state, under the first amendment, has
28 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-224 (1963).
21) Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30 Hammett, The Homogenized Wal, 53 A.B.A.J. 929, 934
(1967).
1971]
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a broad discretionary range within which it may bestow favors
on the church -favors which may constitutionally be extend-
ed to the church in order to secure its cooperation on matters
in which the state is interested for purely secular reasons. The
granting of an ad valorem tax exemption for all property used
exclusively for religious purposes well may be a permissible
favor. The Walz decision failed clearly to resolve this issue.
David L. Pauling
O'NEAL v. STATE
O'Neal was served with a subpoena duces tecum which
required him to appear bfore a grand jury investigating cer-
tain practices in the bail bond business of Oklahoma County.
Installed formally as a witness, O'Neal's testimony was given
without any warning against self-incrimination or promises
of immunity. His testimony resulted in a virtual confession
when he revealed the making, under oath, of a false justifica-
tion on a bail bond. At the conclusion of this testimony, the
County Attorney filed an information charging O'Neal with the
crime of perjury at the time of making the bond justification.
At his trial, grand jurors were allowed to relate defendant's
incriminating grand jury testimony. Subsequently, defendant
was convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County. In
reviewing the record of his trial, the Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals concluded that the conviction was based solely
on the introduction of the grand jurors' testimony and that
perjury could not have been found in the absence of this evi-
dence. The court further determined that defendant's consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination had been violated at
the grand jury proceeding. Thus, evidence based on his testi-
mony at that proceeding was tainted, and the trial court com-
mitted reversible error by admitting this evidence. Therefore,
the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss.1
SO'Neal v. State, 468 P.2d 59 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
[Vol. 7, No. 1
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An Oklahoma statute authorizes a trial court to require
grand jurors to disclose testimony given before them where a
charge of perjury is based on a witness's testimony before the
grand jury.2 However, as the court indicated, such authoriza-
tion is not without limitations;3 it being necessary to consider
the constitutional safeguard afforded the individual against
compelled self-incrimination.4
Generally a witness has been held not to be entitled to a
warning of his constitutional rights.5 Thus, a witness, in order
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, must assert
this right in the course of questioning or it is deemed waived.6
The court in O'Neal acknowledges this general rule and agrees
"that the fact a witness appears before the grand jury under
subpoena does not show that the witness was 'compelled' and
does not prevent the testimony from being 'voluntary.' M,
While the above rule has been held to apply to a witness
merely summoned to testify much in the capacity of a trial
witness, a distinction based on varying standards has just as
often been made where it could be ascertained that the grand
jury witness has been summoned as a prospective defendant.
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 342 (1961).
3 468 P.2d at 66.
SOKLA. CONST. art 2, § 21 provides: "No person shall be com-
pelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate him
except as in this Constitution specifically provided...."
United States v. Dilffichele, 375 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); United States v. Orta, 253 F.2d
312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 905 (1958); United
States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 836 (1957); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
6 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951);
United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957); United States v. Lawn, 115
F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom.
United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1953).
7 468 P.2d at 67.
19711
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Consequently, courts have held that a witness must be warned
of his privilege against self-incrimination where he has been
charged with a criminal violation or, if it clearly appears at
the time he gives testimony, he is the target of a prospective
criminal action.8 The usual dictate is that the witness be in
fact a de jure defendant, already under some formal charge
or complaint.9 Even under the most liberal view, the courts
have demanded at least some affirmative indication that the
witness was a target for prosecution."0
United States v. Scully" has been widely cited for the
holding that "the mere possibility that the witness may later
be indicted furnishes no basis for requiring that he be ad-
vised of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, when sum-
moned to give testimony before a Grand Jury." Concurring
in Scully, Judge Frank found no facts which would establish a
de facto defendant status. However, Judge Frank suggests that
an inquiry into the intention of the prosecutor may be proper
beyond the appraisal of the witness's de jure status. "Several
state and federal courts have gone further in holding or indi-
cating that warning is necessary if it unmistakably appears
that, when a witness is under subpoena before a grand jury,
8 United States v. Edgerton, 80 F. 374 (D. Mont. 1897); see,
e.g., United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.
1967); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116-19 (2d Cir.)
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955);
United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d
467 (2d Cir. 1953).
' United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967);
Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 578-79 (1st Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1936); United States v.
Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1953);
United States v. Miller, 80 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
10 See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 401 F.2d 248, 250 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116-19 (2d
Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
" 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
[Vol. 7, No. I
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the prosecutor then intends to seek the witness' indictment."'12
But Judge Frank imposes the condition that "the [subse-
quently] indicted person state under oath, at least on informa-
tion and belief, specific facts pointing very clearly to the
existence of such an intention."' 3
Although, in O'Neal, there was no formal charge or com-
plaint made against the defendant prior to his grand jury
appearance, the court determined "that this defendant was
called before the grand jury for the purpose of obtaining
evidence on an anticipated charge, and that the defendant was
the target of the investigation."'14 Dissenting, Judge Bussey
declared that "the grand jury investigation was a general in-
vestigation of the bail bonding business and the defendant was
not the 'target' of the investigation."'15 The majority conceded
that the trial record failed to affirmatively reflect the prosecu-
tor's intention when he subpoenaed the defendant. 6 However,
acording to the majority, it was sufficient if the record revealed
that the witness had developed into a potential defendant dur-
ing the course of interrogation:
Notwithstanding the fact that the grand jury might
have been called for the purpose of inquiring into the
bail bond business generally, when it became apparent
to the grand jury that the witness was to become a de-
fendant [assuming such fact was not known when
the inquiry commenced], the witness should have been
excused from further inquiry by the grand jury; or,
at his trial before the testimony was admitted, the
State should have made a positive showing that the
12 Id. at 116.
13 Id. at 117.
14 468 P.2d at 68.
'r Id. at 72.
'16 Id. at 67. The court stated: "Whether or not the defendant
was actually a target of the investigation, and a potential
defendant to a perjury charge, could be answered by only
one man, who did not provide the answer. Further, the
answer is not contained in the record of trial." Id.
1971]
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defendant was fully advised of his constitutional rights
against. self-incrimination; and that he understand-
ingly waived those rights.
17
Thus, the court found a violation of defendant's constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination although he was not
a de jure defendant at the time of his grand jury testimony,
and despite the fact that a determination could not be made
in regard to the subjective intention of the prosecutor in issu-
ing the subpoena duces tecum. Notwithstanding the court's
conclusion that O'Neal was a target of the grand jury investi-
gation, an analysis of the case indicates that the constitutional
violation occurs at that point in the grand jury questioning
when the witness is placed in the position that his testimony
will necessarily be incriminating. Therefore, in the writer's
opinion, O'Neal stands for the proposition that interrogation of
a witness, where it can be foreseen that the witness would be
expected to incriminate himself, is violative of his right not to
be compelled to incriminate himself. Hence, the testimony
elicited from the defendant, amounting to a confession, did
not meet the voluntariness requirement set out in Smith v.
State.'8
Confessions are either voluntary or involuntary. If
voluntary, they may be admitted in evidence. If invol-
untary, they are inadmissible.' 9
A 'voluntary confession' is one made by an accused
freely and voluntarily, without duress, fear or compul-
sion in its inducement, and with full knowledge of the
nature and consequences of the confession.
2 0
The Supreme Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois2' and Miranda
v. Arizona,22 might well have provided the underpinnings, sub
silentio, of the present holding. The O'Neal court points out
17 Id. at 68.
18 77 Okla. Crim. 142, 140 P.2d 237 (1943).
19 Id. at 237 (Syllabus 1 by the court).
20 Id. (Syllabus 2 by the court).
21 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
22 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the necessarily custodial nature of the defendant's subpoenaed
testimony. "Had this defendant left, or attempted to leave
the grand jury room, the county attorney would have had him
arrested and he would have been cited by the court for con-
tempt."2
Whether the court of criminal appeals would wish con-
sciously to hold Escobedo and Miranda applicable to grand
jury proceedings, the court in effect applies their rationale to
the right to be advised of the privilege against self-incrimna-
tion. In Miranda it was said:
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed
in any significant way from being compelled to in-
criminate themselves. We have concluded that without
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interroga-
tion of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling presures which work to under-
mine the individual's will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
In order to combat these pressures and to permit a
full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of
those rights must be fully honored.24
The O'Neal court's underlying determination that the
distinction between the de jure and the de facto defendant
should be removed, should meet with considerable favor. Re-
jected is the mere technical status of the individual as the dic-
tating circumstance in deciding when the defendant must be
advised of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. It has been suggested that where the distinction exists
"[t]he prosecutor can take advantage of this anomalous treat-
ment by deferring formal charge, summoning a de facto de-
23 468 P.2d at 67 (footnote omitted.).
24 384 U.S. at 467.
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fendent before the grand jury and seeking disclosures which
ensure indictment and may be used at trial [, and t]he anom-
aly is heighted by the de facto defendant's relative lack of pro-
tection, since formal charge makes the de lure accused aware
of the danger of self incrimination and the need for counsel. '2
The burden placed upon the prosecutor should be quite
apparent. He has the duty of managing his questions and
anticipating their ability to elicit incriminating testimony. The
former duty may prove damaging, but most likely when the
prosecutor fails through undersight, haste, or eagnerness to
interrupt his questioning to warn the witness. But these cir-
cumstances are mistakes on his part and probably would not
justify removing the duty. On the other hand, the duty of
anticipating his questions' ability to elicit incriminating testi-
mony may prove more onerous. Ths is a matter of determin-
ation on his part and might be expected to be a proper sub-
ject of dispute and differing interpretation in which the prose-
cutor could be given the benefit of doubt. But it seems to
this writer that a confession or an admission by an unwarned
witness will seldom be tendered in response to the prose-
cutor's inquiry without that answer, upon retrospective
scrutiny, being seen as one of the expected results of the ques-
tioning. Therefore, it is conceivable that, in almost all in-
stances where such an unwarned witness responds with an
incriminating statement, the statement, under O'Neal, will
prove inadmissible regardless of the intention of the prosecu-
tor or his expectations regarding the answer. This, of course,
excludes those few confessions or admissions which are the
product of non sequitor responses. These responses cannot be
reasonably expected and therefore would not fall within the
rule of O'Neal.
DonaZd H. Darbee
25 Note, Self Incrimination by Federal Grand Jury Witnesses:
Uniform Protection Advocated, 67 YALE L.J. 1271, 1277
(1958) (footnotes omitted.) (emphasis in the original).
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